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Abstract 
 
 
The importance of effective multilateral security networks is widely recognised 
in Australia and internationally as being essential to facilitate the large-scale 
sharing of information required to respond to the threat of terrorism. Australian 
national security agencies are currently constructing networks in order to bring 
the diverse national and international security agencies together to achieve this. 
This paper examines this process of security network formation in the area of 
critical infrastructure protection, with particular emphasis on airport security. We 
address the key issues and factors shaping network formation and the 
dynamics involved in network practice. These include the need for the networks 
to extend membership beyond the strictly defined elements of national security; 
the integration of public and private ‘nodes’ in counter-terrorism ‘networks’; and 
the broader ‘responsibilisation’ of the private sector and the challenges with 
‘enabling’ them in counter-terrorism networks. We argue that the need to 
integrate public and private agencies in counter-terrorism networks is necessary 
but faces considerable organisational, cultural, and legal barriers. 
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 1
Introduction 
 
 
The new threat environment demands vigilance on all fronts. The Australian 
government recognises that it is critical to our national security that it has 
cooperative relations with the states and territories, a strong partnership with 
the private sector and broad engagement with the Australian public (Australian 
Government 2004a, p.viii). 
 
The field of counter-terrorism in Australia involves a multiplicity of departments, 
organisations and agencies across commonwealth, state, and territory levels of 
government. In counter-terrorism the field transcends the usual binary divides of 
law enforcement–intelligence, civil–military, and public–private. In the process 
of transcending these divides, the diverse actors or ‘nodes’ in the organisational 
field are increasingly forming ‘networks’ in order to exchange information and 
intelligence (or ‘knowledge’), and share the ‘risk’ of terrorism (Brodeur & Dupont 
2006). However, such processes function as means to both include and exclude 
different nodes, as well as locales of negotiation in terms of how risk is 
interpreted and accepted by different security nodes. Moreover, the 
complexities of such arrangements are intensified at sites of critical 
infrastructure, in which the private sector is necessarily brought to the fore in 
counter-terrorism networks. This paper analyses the reshaping of the 
organisational field (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) of security and counter-terrorism 
into networks at airports in Australia. We examine Wheeler’s Independent 
Review of Airport Security and Policing (2005) to explore the analytic utility of 
security networks literature for identifying problems in security networks in terms 
of the sharing of information, organisational dynamics, and the integration of 
public and private sector security nodes. The review of the Wheeler report in 
light of this literature also has broader implications for our understanding of the 
dynamics of networked security arrangements across the field of counter-
terrorism networks.  
 
 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Reshaping the Organisational Field 
 
 
There is no doubt that terrorism is reshaping the parameters of the security field. In 
response to the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent attacks such as the 12 
October 2002 Bali bombings, the Australian Government has undertaken a series of 
amendments to existing legislation as well as introduced new legislation designed to 
enhance our capacity to deal with acts of terrorism. In short, a ‘terrorist act’ (see 
Commonwealth Criminal Code s. 100.1)1 is defined as: 
 
an act or threat, intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause 
by coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government or the public, by 
causing serious harm to people or property, creating a serious risk of health 
and safety to the public, or seriously disrupting trade, critical infrastructure or 
electronic systems (National Counter-Terrorism Committee 2005, p 2:2(5)). 
 
While legal definitions of terrorism are inevitably problematic (Golder & Williams 2004; 
O'Neill, Rice & Douglas 2004) and Australia’s legislative response has frequently been 
called into question (Hocking 2004; Tham 2004; McCulloch & Tham 2005), our focus 
here is not to add to such criticisms, but rather point to some of the ways in which 
these initiatives have shaped the security field. In general terms, the new criminal law 
provisions produced two outcomes. On the one hand, they represent a dramatic 
increase to the powers of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. On the other 
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hand, they extend significantly the terrorism-related offences well beyond the forms of 
terrorism conjured in the public imagination such as suicide bombings and hijackings. 
Such extensions include attempts to inflict and incite terrorist violence, making a 
donation to organisations that are related to terrorism, or having any information that 
security authorities believe would assist them in the prevention and control of terrorism. 
In other words, legislative reach is extended to the array of risk factors that might 
ultimately lead to a terrorist incident rather than being limited to the incident, or 
planning of the incident itself (Palmer & Whelan 2006). These developments 
emphasise the governmental concern for ‘risky’ subjects and ‘risky’ behaviours 
(O’Malley 2004) and further push the responsibility for the provision of security across a 
range of state and non-state actors. 
 
The impact of this increasing preoccupation with terrorism risks can be seen across the 
entire field of security and counter-terrorism. A key element of such changes is the 
broader governmental strategy of ‘responsibilisation’, whereby governmental strategies 
are being employed to make everybody responsible for the management of their own 
risks (O'Malley & Palmer 1996). These responsibilisation techniques transcend the 
already broad organisational field of counter-terrorism, since all Australian citizens are 
enrolled in responding to the risk of terrorism through the governmental instruction of 
‘be alert but not alarmed’ (Palmer & Whelan 2006). Government agencies and 
departments are responding to this risk in several ways. Importantly, the ‘prevalence 
and multidimensional implications of risk prevent any single player, no matter how large 
and resourceful, to shoulder it alone’, which results in the creation of ‘networks’ to 
ensure a pooling of resources and dilution of liability, in order to make risk ‘more 
acceptable to handle’ (Dupont 2004, p. 78). Security and counter-terrorism networks 
involving law enforcement, intelligence, and defence agencies are becoming 
increasingly present in the organisation of counter-terrorism. However, the internal 
dynamics of the networks has received insufficient attention. Further, the complex 
dynamics of such networks are intensified when membership necessarily extends to 
the private sector, something which we seek to articulate through focusing on security 
arrangements at sites of critical infrastructure. 
 
The responsibilisation of the private sector ties in with broader developments in the 
field, including the ‘multilateralisation’ (Bayley & Shearing 2001) and ‘commodification’ 
(Newburn 2001) of security. In short, each of these terms refers to the blurring 
boundaries between state and non-state auspices (sponsors) and providers of security, 
thereby raising concerns of security as a ‘collective good’ (Loader & Walker 2001; 
Palmer & Whelan 2006). In this context, the reshaping of the security field is not simply 
in response to the limitations of the sovereign state (Garland 2001), but rather 
recognition of the necessity of private sector involvement in the delivery of security 
measures. This is particularly so in the area of critical infrastructure, given that much of 
this is privately owned and operated yet simultaneously plays an integral role enabling 
the functioning of the state. The protection of critical infrastructure is thus a task of 
engendering enhanced responsibilisation in the private sector, something that requires 
considerable effort. In some instances, this is achieved through the commands of the 
sovereign state though it is now increasingly common to use alternative ‘consensual’ 
measures that work upon, and through, administrative mechanisms that strengthen risk 
management capacities in the private sector.2 For example, counter-terrorism units 
across state law enforcement agencies act as sources of expert knowledge and 
information to work with owners and operators of critical infrastructure to establish, 
implement and review risk management plans (Rothery 2005). The underlying logic is 
that once owners and operators of critical infrastructure are informed of the risks and 
the requirements for prevention and response to acts of terrorism, they will fully 
cooperate with risk management protocols. Thus, the governmental objective is to 
achieve voluntary acceptance of risk avoidance measures by the private sector rather 
than the imposition of these measures by the state. Accordingly, it is clear that the 
protection of critical infrastructure symbolises broader negotiations taking place in the 
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‘field of security’ (Dupont 2006), which can only be fully explored by taking into account 
the internal dynamics of contemporary security arrangements. After presenting an 
understanding of security and counter-terrorism networks, we explore these 
developments by way of analysing key issues associated with such networks operating 
at airports in Australia.  
 
 
The Organisational Field Refined: Security and Counter-Terrorism Networks 
 
 
A security network can be defined as ‘a set of institutional, organisational, communal or 
individual agents or nodes … that are interconnected in order to authorise and/or 
provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders’ (Dupont 2004, p. 78). 
Such networks are designed to coordinate multi-nodal activities and share 
responsibilities, resources, information and/or knowledge across nodes more efficiently 
and effectively than vertical or hierarchical structures. This requires, as will be shown 
below, a number of organisational and relational conditions to be met. In the field of 
counter-terrorism, networks are composed of many different organisations and 
agencies, each of them acting as nodes, and may operate on a transnational, national, 
and subnational scale (Gill 2006). Further, the different nodes form their own networks, 
constructed to undertake specific tasks, yet at the same time are linked by the common 
purpose of deterring, preventing, detecting, disrupting, and investigating acts of 
terrorism. Hence, the principal objective ‘is to emulate the brain, where each nerve cell 
has its own specialised function and yet is also connected into a network of other cells. 
The result of this cooperation and coordination is a fully functioning organism’ 
(Clutterbuck 2004, p. 157). To be sure, counter-terrorism networks—or ‘networks of 
networks’—are complex organisational designs and attempting to trace boundaries 
between the constituent nodes and the functions they perform can be a perilous 
exercise. Nonetheless, such networks inextricably involve the ‘creation, conversion, 
and distribution of knowledge’, which takes place at the ‘social’ (informal) and 
‘institutional’ (formal) level (Brodeur & Dupont 2006, p. 20). Understanding and 
analysing how this occurs in airports and elsewhere is critical to maximising security 
outcomes. 
 
Although counter-terrorism networks can take many forms, the most prominent is 
fusion centres or task forces (Gill 2006, p. 37). These bodies ‘seek to harness the 
power of informal “knowledge networks” through the creation of integrated structures 
that act as connecting platforms’ (Brodeur & Dupont 2006, p. 21). In these units, 
members from a number of agencies are brought together in ‘all-channel networks’ 
(whereby each node is connected to every other node, see Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2005), 
each with access to their respective databases, in order to integrate analytical 
resources, and overcome the incompatibility of technological systems or privacy 
restrictions concerning the sharing of information. In attempting to break down ‘borders’ 
between agencies, these bodies act as ‘bridges’ across voids (Gill 2006, p. 37), 
designed ‘to provide a venue for information sharing and cooperation’ (Hulnick 2006, p. 
304). Although the terms centres and task forces overlap in application, there are some 
general differences between institutional networks. Centres aim to provide a venue to 
share information and intelligence, whereas task forces seek to integrate law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies across independent jurisdictions in order to 
investigate terrorism offences. Both of these have been established in many countries. 
Examples of intelligence centres comprising numerous government agencies and 
departments in order to, inter alia, pool and analyse terrorism related intelligence 
include the US National Counterterrorism Center (formerly the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Centre that incorporated the pre-existing Counterterrorism Centre) (National 
Counterterrorism Centre 2005); the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (MI5 2006); 
and, the National Threat Assessment Centre in Australia (Australian Government 
2004b). Examples of law enforcement task forces include the US Local and National 
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Joint Terrorism Task Forces (FBI 2004); the Integrated National Security Enforcement 
Teams in Canada (Canadian Government 2004); and the Joint Counter-Terrorism 
Teams in Australia (Australian Government 2004a).  
 
While counter-terrorism networks significantly enable the sharing of information they 
are far from ‘seamless’ (Gill 2006, p. 36). There are a number of organisational, 
technical,3 and sometimes legal barriers to sharing information, especially in the field 
of security, within which counter-terrorism networks must navigate. In particular, 
concerns of secrecy, trust, and occupational culture can lead to the 
compartmentalisation and hoarding of information (Brodeur & Dupont 2006). In terms 
of secrecy, the sharing of information is facilitated by the ‘need to know’ principle, a 
principle determined by political, legal, and organisational imperatives. It is, for 
example, an offence in most countries to provide information to agencies or agents that 
do not hold the appropriate security clearance, and there is considerable tension 
between ‘operational security’ and ‘information sharing’ to protect sources, means, and 
interests (Sullivan & Bunker 2005, p. 194). With regard to trust, information exchanges 
between agencies and agents are based on inter-agency and inter-personal trust. 
Moreover, concerns of trust restrict the size and composition of counter-terrorism 
networks, as the larger the network the more difficult it becomes to develop and 
maintain trustful relationships. Both these issues—secrecy and trust—come together in 
occupational culture and the already well-identified cultural barriers to information 
sharing (Treverton 2003; Hitz & Weiss 2004). Each of these problems with counter-
terrorism networks—secrecy, trust and occupational cultures—were documented in 
some detail in the 9/11 Commission Report analysing the relationship between, for 
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004).  
 
These problems of information sharing are exacerbated by the highly complex 
dynamics of counter-terrorism networks. Although the diverse nodes share the 
common objective of counter-terrorism, it cannot be assumed that what constitutes 
success is the same for the different agencies and agents (Brodeur & Dupont 2006) 
and conflicts may occur between nodes within networks. Conflicts can take place for 
several reasons, including similar and different mandates and objectives, which may or 
may not overlap, and competition for primacy and resources (Gill 2006). It is also the 
case that the fuzzy boundaries between nodes makes identifying precise roles and 
responsibilities for individual nodes problematic. In turn, this lack of precision makes it 
difficult to specify accountabilities for each constituent node, as well as the 
accountability of the network as a whole (Palmer & Whelan 2006).4 Such problems 
intensify further still and become even more complex when the counter-terrorism 
network is extended to include the private sector (Sullivan & Bunker 2005; Palmer & 
Whelan 2006). In this context, problems concerning the sharing of information, 
divergent and convergent interests, and responsibilisation strategies, can be identified. 
We further analyse these issues through a case study of security networks in one key 
area of critical infrastructure—airport security in Australia. 
 
 
Critical Infrastructure: Airport Security Networks 
 
 
Al-Qa’ida and associated groups have the intent and capability to target critical 
infrastructure. They concentrate on such targets because of their economic 
and/or symbolic value, and are fully cognisant of the dramatic psychological 
and economic impact this type of attack produces (ASIO 2003, cited in Yates 
2003, p. 48). 
 
The securing of critical infrastructure from the threat of terrorism is one of the most 
significant challenges facing nation-states across the developed world. While the 
meaning of the term critical infrastructure differs between jurisdictions and its 
 5
implementation ‘leaks’ within federated systems of government (Palmer & Whelan 
2006), the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection defines critical 
infrastructure as: 
 
those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable 
for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic 
well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence 
and ensure national security (Trusted Information Sharing Network 2004, p. 3). 
 
Critical infrastructure thus covers sectors as diverse as banking and finance, transport 
and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply, communications systems, and 
national icons (Trusted Information Sharing Network 2004). Throughout the democratic 
world, much of this infrastructure is privately owned and operated. For example, in the 
US private ownership constitutes around 85 per cent (Department of Homeland 
Security 2006); in the UK the ‘majority’ of critical infrastructure is privately owned 
(National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre 2006); and in Australia 
approximately 90 per cent of critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated 
(Trusted Information Sharing Network 2004). Accordingly, the perennial security 
problems of communication, information sharing, coordination, and the dynamics within 
counter-terrorism networks are magnified as the site of intervention moves from state-
owned to privately-owned entities. These complexities impact all forms of critical 
infrastructure, yet their precise dynamics are perhaps best articulated through the 
example of airports. Airports are a crucial form of critical infrastructure and, since 11 
September, security at airports has become a central focus with most democratic 
countries having undertaken (and are continually undertaking) considerable reviews of 
their existing security arrangements. In Australia, the most significant recent review into 
airport security to date has been An Independent Review of Airport Security and 
Policing (Wheeler 2005).  
 
Following a series of concerns regarding organised drug trafficking at Australian 
airports during 2004–2005, as well as the general elevated threat of terrorism globally 
and regionally, on 7 June 2005, Sir John Wheeler was commissioned to undertake an 
independent review into security and policing arrangements at all Australian airports.5 
In short, Wheeler was tasked to review the threat from organised crime and terrorism, 
and to make recommendations on strengthening the existing security and counter-
terrorism arrangements across Australian airports (Wheeler 2005, p. vii). While 
Wheeler examines airport security in some detail in his 143 page report (completed 
September 2005), our focus here is on themes discussed above relating to integrating 
the airport security community through networks. Wheeler noted that security at 
Australian airports has long been characterised by multi-agency dynamics in which 
commonwealth, state (or territory), and private sector elements have, to varying 
degrees, been involved in security networks. The most prominent example of such 
networks is the Airport Security Committee. Airport Security Committees are one of the 
three pillars of preventative security (the other two being the Transport Security 
Program and the Aviation Security Identification Card), and are one of the most 
significant formal security and counter-terrorism networks at airports. However, 
Wheeler’s review identified many of the common problems facing such networks, 
particularly the overlapping issues of information sharing and organisational dynamics. 
Further, given the prominence of the private sector as owners and operators of airports 
and airlines, and having their own security personnel, information and needs, Wheeler 
identified many weaknesses and challenges regarding the interaction between public 
and private security nodes in these networks. Taken together, Wheeler distinguished 
between those problems he regarded as ‘minor’ and ‘easily’ addressed, and others that 
are ‘substantial’, even ‘systemic’, and require determined action as soon as possible 
(Wheeler 2005, p. 33). These substantial and systemic weaknesses concerned cultural 
issues, command and control, inadequate information on crime and criminality, airport 
security arrangements, border controls, and regional aviation. Though many of these 
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concerns have been (or are being) addressed, in what follows, we draw upon key 
sections of Wheeler’s findings to illustrate several key issues pertaining to information 
sharing and organisational dynamics in airport security networks. We then raise some 
general observations regarding the broader responsibilisation issues associated with 
airport security. 
 
 
Information Sharing 
 
 
Wheeler’s review outlined a number of issues or barriers to the sharing of information 
and intelligence across the airport security community. Although these issues are 
diverse, Wheeler invariably grouped such problems under the rubric of ‘cultural issues’, 
which brings together the problems of secrecy, trust, and occupational culture. While 
such factors are an endemic problem in security, Wheeler documents how these issues 
have developed in the airport sector specifically. These cultural issues encompassed ‘a 
marked inhibition about information sharing with those who need it to make evidence-
based decisions’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 33). For Wheeler, this ‘marked inhibition’ occurred 
for several reasons, most notably due to occupational culture, resulting from long-held 
agency ‘traditions’—perhaps derived from a time when intelligence had a different 
function—of ‘keeping their knowledge to themselves’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 34). Moreover, 
Wheeler suggested that concerns of secrecy and trust are central components of this. 
In terms of secrecy, he maintained that agencies hoard information due to the premium 
placed on ‘operational security’; the need for police to protect operational information in 
order to obtain successful prosecutions; and legislation restricting the sharing of 
classified information.6 With regard to trust, Wheeler stated that agencies are generally 
reluctant to share information due to the fear of ‘leaks’ once it is disclosed (Wheeler 
2005, p. 34). While Wheeler suggested that these problems are evident throughout the 
airport security community, he argued that the private sector has been the most to 
suffer: ‘Australia appears to be lagging behind leading Western countries, such as the 
UK, in integrating intelligence exchange between the public and private sectors’ 
(Wheeler 2005, p. xxi) and, as a result, ‘private sector elements are crying out to be 
brought up-to-date and kept up-to-date on the dangers they face from crime and 
terrorism’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 34). Thus, the problems of occupational culture, secrecy, 
and trust are more heavily concentrated in the area of state and non-state relations.  
 
To address these ‘cultural issues’, Wheeler pointed to the need for a ‘changed culture 
of cooperation, sharing, and openness … across Federal, State and private sector 
agencies and personnel, in order to replace the silos and insularity which continue to 
provide unnecessary weaknesses that could be exploited by criminals and terrorists’ 
(Wheeler 2005, p. xv). On this, he argued that effective leadership is essential to 
surmount existing procedures and practices that inhibit information sharing. Further, 
Wheeler acknowledged that the legal structures reinforcing the ‘marked inhibition’ to 
share information must be addressed. This is made clear by his bleak assessment that 
‘if legislation and privacy guidelines currently prevent sharing of security-related 
information, changes must be made: such constraints do not apply to terrorists and 
criminals’ (Wheeler 2005, p. xii). More fundamentally, he argued that ‘until all 
connected with aviation and airport security put into practice the idea that information is 
a primary weapon in planning the protection of the Australian community from crime 
and terrorism, and that sharing information is a means of sharpening that weapon, the 
security system will falter’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 34). Hence, it is clear that several issues 
concerning the sharing of information need to be addressed before security networks 
such as Airport Security Committees are able to be effective in terms of processing and 
disseminating information. However, what appears to be missed in Wheeler’s analysis 
of information sharing is a more detailed and nuanced understanding of occupational 
cultures and the limited capacity to change sub-cultural practices through legislative or 
administrative fiat. An examination of any of the major police inquiries in Australia over 
 7
the past fifteen years would quickly identify the limits to such strategies and the 
magnitude of the task of cultural change, at the least requiring recognition of the need 
to address both the structural conditions of security work (the political, social, legal and 
occupational contexts, and the differential power and authority of security agencies), 
and the different perceptions and attitudes within the security agencies that shapes 
why and how to do security work (Chan 1997; Chan, Devery & Doran 2003).  
 
 
Organisational Dynamics 
 
 
While Wheeler noted that the existing Airport Security Committees ‘provide a useful 
forum for exchanging ideas and bringing agencies up to date on broad security 
developments’, he identified a number of problems regarding their organisational 
dynamics that, like the barriers to information sharing, substantially reduced their 
effectiveness (Wheeler 2005, p. 44). More specifically, Wheeler suggested such 
networks suffer from structural and organisational problems in areas as diverse as 
membership, mandate and authority. In regards to membership, Wheeler noted that in 
order to capture the diverse and dispersed stakeholders involved in airport security, 
Airport Security Committees had extremely large memberships that, in some of 
Australia’s larger airports (such as Sydney), included over thirty representatives 
(Wheeler 2005, pp. 21-2). This extensive membership was a significant problem for 
Wheeler, mainly because it meant that the sharing of information and discussion of 
security-related operations could not easily occur, since this is often based on 
classified reporting. On this, Wheeler noted that some members of the Committee did 
not have an appropriate security clearance while others had none at all. Furthermore, 
these Committees lacked, according to Wheeler, appropriate leadership and authority. 
In part, this view derived from his argument that Airport Security Committees did not 
appropriately follow the formal guidelines (as proscribed by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization), and that they lacked a clearly established mandate. As a result, 
and perhaps reflecting the general ‘managerialist’ desires for limited participation and 
lessening diversity, Wheeler expressed concern that each airport tended to structure 
and operate these Committee’s differently, meaning they ‘vary enormously in 
effectiveness’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 64). More generally, and it is a problem that pervades 
counter-terrorism, there are serious deficits in our ability to quantify security risks, 
which in turn makes the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness at least 
problematic (Zedner 2003). 
 
Nonetheless, Wheeler suggested that these problems could be overcome by 
addressing the organisational dynamics of Airport Security Committees. What is 
needed, Wheeler recommended, ‘is a more focused and integrated security committee 
system with more authority and enhanced ability to share information. The way forward 
is to change the size, composition, and nature of the Airport Security Committee’ 
(Wheeler 2005, p. 64). On this, Wheeler recommended that the current committee 
system be divided into two, with the existing Airport Security Committees becoming 
Airport Security Consultative Groups, which will serve as a subsidiary to the reformed 
Airport Security Committee by way of providing a venue for the exchange of less 
‘sensitive’ information across a wide array of stakeholders. The new Airport Security 
Committees would thus be transformed into a much more effective and authoritative 
security network. To facilitate this, Wheeler argued that all members of the Airport 
Security Committee should have an appropriate security clearance, which will address 
some of the concerns of secrecy and trust preventing the sharing of information, and 
will be comprised of only high-level representatives who are able to make decisions 
and take actions. Accordingly, the transformed Airport Security Committees would have 
no more than ten members, will be chaired by the Airport’s CEO, and be comprised of 
only other key nodes such as those government agencies with airport-security interests 
and capabilities, and representatives from major operators at the airport, including an 
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airline and Airservices Australia representative. The redesign of the Airport Security 
Committees should substantially improve the quality of communications between 
security nodes. It is clear that appropriate security clearances are essential in enabling 
the sharing of classified information, and that relationships based on high degrees of 
trust are more difficult to sustain in larger networks where opportunities for 
interpersonal relationships to form may be reduced and the risk of potential leaks 
perhaps increased. However, once more, such efforts are likely to do little to address 
bureaucratic or cultural inhibitions to sharing information should they occur (Sullivan & 
Bunker 2005). 
 
 
Responsibilisation 
 
 
The Wheeler Review serves as a case study of ‘responsibilisation’ in the face of 
unknowable security risks (Zedner 2003). Much of the literature focuses on the way in 
which governments seek to make the non-government sectors responsible for their 
own security. To some extent, this is also true in the area of critical infrastructure 
generally, and airport security specifically. Through Wheeler’s findings we have sought 
to illustrate that the more complex the security environment, the more difficult it is to 
implement and manage effective security networks. On this, Wheeler repeatedly stated 
that the airport security community was not appropriately integrated, especially when it 
comes to the private sector. Hence, the multilateralisation of security at sites of critical 
infrastructure adds substantive levels of complexity to which auspices and providers 
must overcome. It is not simply enough to make the private sector responsible for 
owning and managing risk; the government must give them the appropriate tools to do 
so, since any act of terrorism at sites of critical infrastructure is likely to have nationally 
significant ramifications (Palmer & Whelan 2006).  
 
Yet, as Wheeler’s review illustrated, the ‘enabling’ of the private sector remains a stark 
challenge at sites of critical infrastructure, but it is also true that the non-state sector 
seek greater involvement in the security networks. Wheeler’s analysis is a case study 
in how the private sector seeks to enter into security networks, utilising the broad and 
unspecified concerns with ‘insecurity’, but also seeks to shape the nature of these 
networks and the division of responsibilities. Put simply, the private sector are 
particularly keen to enjoy enhanced information and greater planning roles, yet at the 
same time seek to limit the extent to which they carry the financial burdens of 
increased security to effectively managing the risk of terrorism. It can be argued that 
this represents a meeting of the politics and economics of risk management. Risks are 
seen to exist objectively even though Wheeler noted the distinct lack of ‘accurate’ data 
available on crime in airports and simply referred to ‘classified material’ that linked 
terrorists with criminal activity in general (2005, p.9). Nonetheless, Wheeler is able to 
somewhat dramatise the risks by claiming that: ‘terrorism, organised crime and 
opportunistic crime constitute the major security threats to Australia’s airports’ (Wheeler 
2005, p.7). In a summary of identified criminal activities, theft constituted 61% of crime, 
with other offences largely related to alcohol and vandalism (Wheeler 2005, pp.111-2), 
though the Government’s White Paper is used to stress the international risks of airport 
related terrorism (Wheeler 2005, pp. 108-9). Thus, Wheeler’s attention is directed 
towards the means for the institutionalisation of networked policing reforms, albeit with 
the price of greater financial input from government. 
 
While the responsibilisation of the private sector involves the governmental message 
that security is ‘a cost of doing business’, this mentality is not straight-forward nor 
strictly followed. For example, Wheeler pointed to on-going and seemingly 
irreconcilable debates concerning the cost of security at airports. More fundamentally, 
he noted just how complex these debates are. That is, his review encountered 
‘business interests’ readily acknowledging that ‘providing security is part of the cost of 
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doing business,’ while ‘almost simultaneously, complaining that government was failing 
to absorb more and more of that cost’ (Wheeler 2005, p. 35). The private sector is seen 
here as negotiating the content of responsibilisation, indicating that sovereign authority 
cannot be unproblematically imposed. Wheeler suggested that in order to prevent such 
issues compromising the nature of security as a collective good, and to not inhibit the 
implementation of the security improvements he identified, much of these costs should 
be met by the government. These debates, being far from resolved, suggest that just 
how far the private sector is willing to employ the security and risk management 
processes demanded, and to absorb the associated costs, remains to be seen. Thus 
the broader processes of responsibilisation operates through incorporating the non-
state security managers and personnel, rationalising the organisation of state and non-
state services under the umbrella of the state and indeed extending the reach of the 
state. However, as a cautionary note, just how much information sharing and partnered 
arrangements enhance security, limit anxiety and protect against the potential 
exclusionary and de-civilising practices of security also remains to be seen.     
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The risks associated with terrorism are increasingly redesigning the organisational field 
of security and counter-terrorism. One particularly important implication of such 
developments has been the fostering of security and counter-terrorism networks to 
share the burden of risk and enable diverse agencies and agents to come together to 
deal with the problem of terrorism. Nonetheless, such responses to terrorism are not 
without their challenges, as organisational, cultural and legal barriers may exist thereby 
inhibiting their effectiveness in terms of procuring and sharing information. Further, the 
more diverse the organisational field represented in counter-terrorism networks, the 
more intense such barriers become. In this paper, we analysed and illustrated these 
issues in the context of critical infrastructure, using Wheeler’s review into airport 
security and policing in Australia as a case study. The Wheeler Review was instructive 
as to the utility of the security networks literature in being able to frame the problems of 
such networks. Such problems and the complexities of security networks are in no way 
limited to airports or to Australia with similar findings being reproduced worldwide. A 
key issue that arose in Wheeler and has arisen in security networks internationally 
concerns the task of effectively responsibilising the private sector in ways to maximise 
their willingness and capacity to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism, while 
concurrently maintaining the autonomy of the market place. To the extent that new 
security arrangements and practices enhance security at airports (or in other sites of 
networked security), networked security requires greater cooperation and collaboration 
between nodes in the network. Just as important, however, is the manner in which 
security networks contribute further to the blurring of state and non-state actors, 
creating potential problems for the accountability of security practices. These remain 
certain and ongoing challenges facing all democratic nation-states. Clearly, one way 
forward is to enhance the cooperation and collaboration between the different counter-
terrorism nodes and to cement such arrangements in appropriately integrated and 
enabled networks. However, the difficulties in doing so should not be underestimated 
and require significantly further analysis.  
 
 
Notes: 
                                                 
1 The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 contains the initial changes to the 
Criminal Code, subsequently amended by further legislation, in particular the Anti-Terrorism Act 
(No.2) 2005 and other additional legislation. 
2 It is important to note that the protection of critical infrastructure is based on the ‘all-hazards’ 
planning of which prevention and response to terrorism is but on of the potential risks owners 
and operators face (Trusted Information Sharing Network 2004). 
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3 Incompatible information technology systems are a significant barrier to information sharing in 
security networks. While such problems are identified throughout the literature, including the 
9/11 Commission Report (2004) and the Wheeler Review (2005), such issues are not ad-
dressed in this paper due to space restrictions. Rather, we focus on the ‘organisational’ as ap-
pose to the ‘technical’ dynamics of security and counter-terrorism networks. 
4 The issue of rendering networks accountable is in no way limited to the context of security or 
counter-terrorism, but rather a feature of networks in general (Considine 2002). 
5 Sir John Wheeler also completed a review into airport security in the UK in 2002, see Wheeler 
(2002). 
6 Wheeler cited several examples of legislation which restricts the sharing of information. These 
include: section 18 of the ASIO Act; section 16 of the Customs Administration Act; and section 
51 of the ACC Act (Wheeler 2005, p. 51). 
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